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I am delighted to introduce Bülay 
Doğan’s CARGC Paper 10, “Contextu-
alizing Hacktivism: The Criminalization 
of Redhack.” Bülay was a Fellow at the 
Center for Advanced Research in Glob-
al Communication in 2017-2018, a Ful-
bright Scholar, and a PhD candidate at 
the Department of Media and Visual Arts 
in Koç University in Istanbul, studying 
the interaction of social movements and 
ideology with science and technology, 
in addition to information technology 
and criminal law. She is also one of the 
founders and executive board members 
of Ozgen Berkol Doğan Science Fiction 
Library, a unique association specialized 
in science-fiction, fantasy, and horror lit-
eratures in Turkey.
CARGC Paper 10 is an original contribu-
tion to the literature on hacking, hacktiv-
ism, criminalization and the state. Through 
a meticulous empirical examination of 
the criminalization of the Turkish hack-
tivist group Redhack, Doğan explores 
the critical conflation of hacktivism with 
cyber-terrorism—by national security or-
ganizations and academic researchers 
alike —that enables states to criminalize 
non-violent hacktivist groups. The paper’s 
empirical sources include interviews with 
Turkish security agents, legal and regula-
tory texts, and its theoretical grounding 
is a combination of literatures on moral 
panic, hacking, social movements, criti-
cal criminology, and framing analysis. In 
examining how Redhack constitutes an 
anomaly, and in exploring how anom-
alies point to the necessity of grounded, 
context-sensitive research, Doğan con-
tributes conceptual development beyond 
Turkey and beyond hacktivism. In doing 
so, this publication embodies CARGC’s 
mission to set regional expertise and the-
oretical advancement in a heuristic ten-
sion with each other.
CARGC Paper 10 is our first publication 
under our recently launched research 
theme, “Digital Sovereignties,” which will 
shape research groups, lectures and con-
ferences at CARGC from 2018 to 2023. 
The recent return of populism, chauvin-
ism and protectionism have reasserted a 
pugnacious nationalism vitally concerned 
with territorial control and cultural purity, 
as satellites, drones, cyberwarfare, and 
digital platforms further erode sovereign-
ty. Questions we will explore under this 
theme include: How have social media 
altered our understandings of sovereign-
ty? How are notions of political, cultur-
al and sexual sovereignty shifting in the 
digital era? How have non-state actors 
affected and exploited these changes? 
Should we rethink our theories of geopol-
itics in light of algorithmic communication 
and digital disinformation? Do the com-
bined geopolitics of infrastructure, data, 
artificial intelligence and cyberwarfare 
portend a new global order?
In addition, as we embark on our sixth 
year, we at CARGC are happy to an-
nounce that we have six outstanding 
postdoctoral fellows in residence in 2018-
2019. They will be working with CARGC 
Doctoral, Undergraduate, and Faculty 
Fellows on individual and collaborative 
research projects. They will also lead the 
inaugural edition of South by Southeast: 
the CARGC Fellows Biennial Conference, 
which will be held in March 2019. You 
can read more about our established and 
new initiatives in CARGC@5, a detailed 
report about our first five years, released 
in July 2018.
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As you read CARGC Paper 10, please 
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Contextualizing Hacktivism: 
The Criminalization of Redhack
INTRODUCTION
This CARGC Paper examines the criminalization of Redhack, a hacktivist group that was very 
active between 2012 and 2017 in Turkey. Although they were founded in 1997, their activity 
started to peak in 2012, which also happened to be the year of global uprisings like the “Arab 
Spring” and the Occupy movement. For Turkey, it was the year that mounting frustration against 
the Justice and Development Party government (known by its Turkish acronym, AKP) boiled over 
into the mass popular uprising of the Gezi protests. 
The most difficult aspect of a scholarly analysis of Redhack is to decide which path to follow 
for a rigorous examination. In both popular imagery and academic literature, Redhack is a 
peculiar object of study for many reasons. Redhack are a group of hackers, objects of fear and 
fascination at the same time, but they are also activists, to which academic interest has turned in 
the aftermath of global tumults. Moreover, the activism of Redhack is not limited to the ideology 
widespread among new social movements but includes a class-based activism articulated, 
in the group’s own words, through a Marxist-Leninist ideology. This characteristic coincides 
with the renascent interest in Leninism in academia and in political discussions.1 Another layer 
of fascination for Western audiences is that this group is in Turkey. Through this Orientalizing 
lens – according to which the only political alternative to capitalism in the Middle East is either 
moderate Islam, compatible with market economy and ‘human rights,’ like the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan between 2002 and 2007, or radical Islam, 
like the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS) – Redhack appears as an anomaly. The presence 
of anticapitalist, anarchist, or socialist alternatives in Middle East, in Turkey, is an uncommon 
phenomenon in the perception of many US and Europe-based academics.
I structured my approach to the case study of Redhack by recognizing these particularities of 
representation. Is Redhack an anomaly, in the sense that they were transgressing the boundaries 
of normality demarcated by the presumptions mentioned above? Other questions followed, 
like what are the boundaries of normality? Who draws these boundaries? When are these 
boundaries activated and in which fields are they present? This led me to these further question, 
if Redhack is an anomaly, what might it tell us about the Turkish context in which it is found and 
1 The interest in Leninism is noticeable in the writings of different scholars in the wake of the 
global uprisings of 2010s. Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Daniel Bensaïd, Alex Callinicos, 
Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, Antonio Negri, and Slavoj Žižek are some of the popular 
leftist thinkers who have written on Leninism in the 2000s and whose speech and writings were 
collected in Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of Truth (Budgen, Kouvelakis and Žižek 2007). 
Other than this tendency to revalorize Leninist principles, there is another conceptualization of 
Leninism as “the Leninist right” with an effort to understand the nature of the recent rise of the 
right in the US (Tuğal 2017) and in Europe (Applebaum 2017).
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about the phenomenon called hacktivism? In this CARGC Paper, I respond to these questions 
through the case study in which I problematize the anomaly of Redhack by critically examining 
the legal boundaries governing the group.
Being an anomaly is closely related to transgressing boundaries, which is always a powerful 
act, since such a crossing affects the boundaries themselves. Transgressions always have the 
potential to blur the area demarcated by these boundaries. In the case of Redhack, among 
many boundaries that can be problematized, I decided to examine legal boundaries. 
A rich theoretical literature has examined how legal boundaries of normality can be 
problematized through the concept of exception. From Schmitt (2005) to Agamben (2005) and 
to Neocleous (2006), discussions have focused on deviations from norms, humans in the state 
of exception, perpetuity versus provisionality of exception, and whether exception is a fact that 
is intrinsic to capitalism or not. Appreciating these theoretical discussions, I tend towards a more 
sociological direction to examine the transgression of legal boundaries in Turkey through the 
example of Redhack.
Legal boundaries first seem like the easiest act of transgression for the social scientist to trace 
because of the presence of clear, written, demarcations of these boundaries. In general, it is the 
specific mission of the judicial body of nation-states to determine whether legal transgressions 
occur in order to decide who the criminal is. Yet, since the pioneering work of Howard Becker 
(1963), scholars from the fields of the sociology of deviance as well as critical criminology 
have problematized the processes of legal transgression. As this body of work demonstrates, 
legal transgression may actually be the most difficult act to trace. Even though it seems like it is 
exclusively dependent on judicial power, in fact, many social actors with power label others as 
criminals and are thus involved in demarcating the processes of legal transgression. Building on 
this scholarly work, I also adopt a social constructionist perspective of crime and understand 
crime not as a definite fact but as a process of criminalization. Thus, I pursue my research 
questions via an examination of how hacktivists in Turkey, based on the prominent example of 
Redhack, are criminalized in social, legal, and cultural discourses. That is, CARGC Paper 10 
examines the seeming anomaly of Redhack in order to explore the criminalization of hacktivism 
in Turkey since 2012.
The larger dissertation project on which this paper draws is a multi-sited study that 
acknowledges how criminalization discourse for hacktivists is framed by different bodies of 
agents. I look at three specific sites for the examination of this discourse in Turkey for the time 
period between 2012 and 2017. In an ideal level, these sites are those who label (the state 
agents), those who are labelled (Redhack) and those who perceive and discuss this labelling 
(the public discourse visible in the mass media). However, as I mentioned above, at the 
material level, these categories are not strictly separate sites because they have serious effects 
on each other to construct, reconstruct, and deconstruct the criminalization discourse and the 
labelling processes. Within the limits of CARGC Paper 10, the focus of my case study is the state 
discourse, the discourse that first labels Redhack a legal anomaly.
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I will proceed as follows: First, starting with attempts to define hacktivism as a neologism, 
(1a) I examine the divide between hacker and hacktivist. Next, (1b) I explore how hacking is 
represented in popular culture and how its relationship to moral panics constitute another main 
component of this crucial context. Then, (1c) I analyze representations of hacktivists within the 
wave of global protests of the 2010s. Secondly, I (2a) situate the case study of Redhack by 
referring to two bodies of work – critical criminology and framing theory. These overlapping 
spheres of literature allow me to view criminalization discourse in Turkey between 2012 and 
2017. With a focus on state discourse, which fits the first category of the larger project, I (2b) 
analyze the criminalization framing of Redhack in judicial documents, in news about Redhack 
and in interviews that I conducted with experts on Redhack from and outside of the Turkish 
state. Third, in the section dedicated to my case study, I (3) exhibit discussions based on three 
findings: the centrality of the Turkish state, the general discourse of terrorism in Turkey, and the 
prominence of the hacktivist craftsman. Last, in the conclusion, I (4) return once again to my 
initial questions about the anomaly of the case study after the examination of the discussions 
based upon the research question of how Redhack is criminalized in Turkey to develop a new 
understanding of the literature of hacktivism as well as to contribute to Turkish studies.
ENTER HACKTIVISM
Hacktivism is a portmanteau of hacking and activism, which was coined in the US by the hacker 
group Cult of the Dead Cow in the 1990s (Shantz and Tomblin 2013). Many recently coined 
terms – digital activism, cyberactivism, e-activism, hacktivism, slacktivism, and clicktivism – 
are used frequently in media studies to describe emerging genres of political engagement. 
The proliferation of neologisms around the notion of activism is undoubtedly related to recent 
social phenomena. When Guobin Yang (2016) explored the cultural, social, and political 
implications of activism, he claimed that online activism should be thought of in the larger 
sociopolitical framework of activism, which for thirty years carried connotations of “moderate 
civic action” until the ambiguous yet significant impact of the worldwide uprisings and anti-
austerity movements in the 2010s. The Indignados movement in Spain, Arab uprisings, Occupy 
movement in the US, and Gezi protests in Turkey can be cited as some of the examples. 
From this perspective, neologisms about online activism correspond to new practices as “a 
promise for many retransformation toward a more radical grassroots politics” together with an 
opposite “pull toward depoliticization” through which radical elements are erased from the 
online activism discourse, especially in the Western context (Yang 2016, 6-7). However, an 
inquiry into the implications of neologisms should also include academic fields, which contribute 
to the popularization of these neologisms. Is there a reason other than recent social phenomena 
that a neologism like “hacktivism” becomes widespread in media activism studies? My 
answer is that this inclination corresponds to an effort of self-vindication. From this problematic 
perspective, ‘old’ terms of ‘old’ media and of ‘old’ social movements are considered incapable 
of capturing the novelties of the computer, internet, and social media ages, and now maybe the 
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application age. This technological determinism reflects the presentism related to the internet 
and a delusion of the internet as something always excitingly new, even though a quarter of a 
century has passed since its public commercial use at the beginning of the 1990s.
Putting aside the deficiency of the field of media activism, neologisms are bound to remain 
artificial unless they are supported by concrete experiences of media users. Hacktivism is 
a fortunate neologism because it is robustly supported by the actors themselves. Different 
experiences of collective action during the 1990s and the 2000s made hacktivism visible 
around the world. The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) is one of the first examples of hacktivism. 
This group did not just shut down websites but also attempted to disturb telecommunication 
infrastructures in protesting against censorship and protests against nuclear testing in the 
late 1980s (Anderson 2008, 5). Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT), which supported 
the Zapatista movement using internet technologies in 1998, and the Electrohippies, which 
participated in the protests in 1999 against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, are some 
of the later hacktivism examples (Jordan and Taylor 2004, 71-79).
In these first outstanding instances of hacktivism, hacking was used explicitly for political 
purposes, following the influential definition of hacktivism of Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor 
(2004, 9). This definition is also in line with the definition of hacking as “the imaginative re-
appropriation of technology’s potential within countercultural and oppositional communities” 
(Jordan and Taylor 2004, 5), an inclusive definition when we consider hacking as not just equal 
to cracking, which means “illicit, illegal or unwanted computer intrusion.”
However, cracking became the dominant image of hackers in popular imagination by the 
mid-1990s and the representation of hackers in the cultural products of this period, originating 
mostly from the US, would prove central in the perception of hackers and hacktivists in following 
periods. To understand this perception, I now turn to the popular culture of the 1990s in Turkey 
and in the US, as the latter deeply influenced the Turkish context.
The 1990s were the peak of the wave of fear and fascination induced by the figure of the 
hacker in a global popular imaginary. In this trend, born in the early 1980s and continuing 
to be influential in the 2010s, the hacker is a criminal, an anti-hero, and usually a dangerous 
male, with whom the audience easily sympathizes. The dangerous image of the hacker does not 
always come from their malicious intentions. Based on the earliest example of a hacker movie, 
WarGames (Badham 1983), Kevin Steinmetz (2016) argues that hackers are represented as 
intrinsically dangerous in the sense that it is their knowledge and their skills that make them 
dangerous (180) and while destruction can arise from “hacker’s moral alignment” (182), the 
risk of destruction is already there, in the figure himself.
When Ulrich Beck wrote his influential Risk Society (1992), he claimed that there was a 
strong relationship between “the gain in power from techno-economic ‘progress’” and the 
production of risks (13). Jordan and Taylor conceptualize this argument within the framework 
of the antagonism between “society’s increasing dependence upon complexly networked 
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communication technologies” and “its inability to maintain and control such technologies” 
(Jordan and Taylor 2004, 21). The ghostly figure of the hacker perfectly occupies this 
intersection of technology with the perception of risk. As “the craftsman of informatics” (Sennett 
2008, 24-27), hackers are represented as if they are “omnipotent technological wizards” 
(Steinmetz 2016, 181). If we put these abstract portrayals of the 1990s in a historical context, 
hackers are constructed as the unpredictable specialists of vulnerable technologies upon which 
emerging neoliberal globalism heavily depends. This vulnerability became much more visible 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, provoking a concretization of fears against hackers 
under the label of cyberterrorism. 
Parallel to the disappearance of the older meanings of hacking, including social hacking, 
which means the manipulation of people to gain access to real and virtual places, the image of 
hackers became much more restricted to virtual space. In a very short time, the representation of 
the virtuality via the green codes trailing vertically down the computer screen in The Matrix (The 
Wachowski Brothers 1999) would become the dominant paradigm of hacker imagery. It would 
be used repeatedly by other movies about hackers. 
As most of the cultural productions about hackers come from the US, understanding the elements 
of this imagery within this context is important. However, it is also important to understand 
that the implications of such elements are not universal. When we look at Turkey for example, 
the hooded figure does not connote criminal activity (as it does in the US and UK contexts). 
In Turkey, this figure is heavily used by the news media to represent hackers during the 2010s 
(see Medyatava 2013; Sputnik Turkiye 2015; Ulusal Kanal 2015; Sendika 2015; Cumhuriyet 
2016; CNN TURK 2016; NTV 2016; Odatv 2017; aHBR 2017; SOL 2017; Yeni Akit 2017; 
Türkiye Gazetesi 2018). The roots of this representation can be traced back to hacker movies. 
Movies about hackers have been accessible and quite influential for hacker imagery in the 
Figure 1: The hooded figure with computer is the most common portrayal of 
hackers in the mainstream media in Turkey (Hürriyet 2017).
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Turkish media since the 1990s. By the late 1990s, the release dates of movies like The Matrix 
can be found in movie databases (IMDB 1999). However, the first broadcast date of earlier 
movies that were not released in theaters but shown on TV are more difficult to find out. This 
methodological problem is added to the perception of the 1990s concept, as an important 
feature of the Turkish TV culture. Whether it is an academic work (Fidaner 2013) or a digital 
post in a giant blog (umut 2003), personal stories about the influence of these hacker movies 
from the 1990s are visible. In his doctoral research about the hacker culture in Turkey at the 
beginning of the 2000s, Ufuk Eriş (2009) claims that even hackers in Turkey have knowledge 
about the worldwide hacker culture, limited to the hacker movies and few books translated to 
Turkish, based on interviews that he conducted with hackers from Turkey (177). By the 2010s, 
when the hooded figure became widespread in hacker movies (such as Who am I? (bo Odar 
2014), Mr. Robot (Esmail, Golin and Hamilton 2015-2018), and Hacker (Satayev 2016)), these 
movies were released or were accessible immediately in Turkey, either through official release 
or unofficial online streaming. Through these movies, the centrality of the hooded figure was 
added to the hacker imagery.
With the rising influence of these movies, the perception of the hooded figure settled into 
to the public imagination not as a general representation of the criminal but as the specific 
representation of the hacker in Turkey. In other words, the hooded figure is directly linked to 
cybercrime in such contexts without any history of hood as the symbol of crime. Even a simple 
Google search with the word ‘hackerlar [hackers in Turkish]’ is enough to provide a sense of the 
imagery of hackers in Turkey. 
Many examples from the Turkish news media that I cited above are quite explicit about 
the usage of the hooded figure only for news related to computer crimes, regardless of the 
ideological position of the outlet. The repetitive frame of hackers as hooded figures shows that 
ideological divides do not always imply a divide in the framing. Whether it is a conservative 
leftist, or mainstream news outlet, all hacker news stories are represented with hooded figures. 
This nuance between ideology and framing is actually a well-developed discussion within the 
field of social movement studies. Departing from how both anti-abortion and pro-abortion 
activists framed the abortion discussion as a secular space in the 1970s , Pamela E. Oliver 
and Hank Johnston (2000) claim that “a simple extrapolation of the underlying ideologies” 
(39) cannot be a source of an extrapolation of framing. This perspective is to acknowledge the 
importance of both ideologies and framings without reducing one to the other, as the only way 
to develop the analytical tools “for talking about this fascinating instance of the same ideologies 
diametrically opposed” (39).
The only exception to this repetitive framing of hacker images in the Turkish news media was 
the now defunct IMC TV, a leftist and pro-Kurdish TV channel and news outlet. Hooded 
figures were not used in their news framings about hackers. This is mostly because IMC TV’s 
broadcasting policy was inclined towards a very specific selection of news, mostly national and 
explicitly political. All of the stories which they framed as cybercrime were specifically about 
hacktivist groups in Turkey. In these stories, they used specific imagery produced by or related to 
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these groups, rather than more general hacker images like hooded figures.2 In other examples 
cited above, the hooded image is typically used for cybercrime or hacktivism issues, with the 
exception of new stories about specific hacktivist groups, where the images of those groups 
are used. It is hard to tell if IMC TV would have used the hooded figure had they broadcasted 
cybercrime news. However, their choice of not covering these stories is also an ideological 
choice. For that reason, it is fair to claim that in this particular example, the framing selection 
and the ideological orientation overlap.
Setting aside the framing tactics of newspapers and other outlets, a deeper analysis of the 
hooded figure itself reveals other issues. The hood is a great tool for anonymization. In hacker 
movies and TV series, the inside of the hood is sometimes visible (Mr. Robot), sometimes invisible 
(Hacker), and there are other times when there is a mask inside the hood (Who am I?), for 
added emphasis on anonymity. Anonymity provided by the hood creates an ambiguity about 
the identity of the hacker, the dangerous criminal. This ambiguity is solidified with the fact that 
tracing a cybercriminal is much more difficult than an ordinary criminal for law enforcement 
agents. The fear of cybercrime crystallizes in the uncertainty and the high perception of risk: 
anyone could be a hacker, anyone could harm you, and they would not be caught. Slowly, 
hackers begin to go beyond this image of the “talented nerd” who has innocent but profitable 
pursuits towards to be seen as an “irreducible systemic threat of digital media” in the discourse 
of the news media (Krapp 2005, 71).
2 This argument is relatively weak because the official website of the news outlet IMC was 
removed after the closure of IMC TV by a police raid right after their news about the leak 
scandal organized by the hacker group Redhack in October 2016. I was limited to an image 
search in their social media accounts (Twitter and Facebook) and to other sources like YouTube 
for records from their broadcasting.
Figure 2: Theatrical release poster of the movie Who Am I (bo Odar 2014).
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The fear of hackers relates to the well-known notion of “folk devils” in critical criminology 
literature. Stanley Cohen, who coined the term, describes folk devils as “actors who embody 
the problem and agencies who are ‘ultimately’ responsible” (Cohen 2002, xxii). Critical 
criminology scholars examine the different meanings that the term “folk devil” carries for various 
groups, as well as the process of creating a folk devil itself. This latter points to a notion closely 
related to the former one – moral panics, or “a condition, episode, person or group of persons 
to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests” (Cohen 2002, 1). According 
to Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009): “To actors caught in the coils of the moral panic, folk 
devils are the personification of evil” (27). In this relation, moral panics create the demonized 
contemporary images of drug dealers, child molesters, juvenile delinquents, and terrorists, as 
well as the more historic images of witches and communists. 
Hackers have also navigated their share of moral panics. David Wall (2012) argues that 
hackers are constructed as cybercriminals through a security discourse that takes its roots from 
social science fiction (7). Moreover, while the construction of cybercriminals lies mostly in 
cultural rather than scientific roots (4), there is an “unquestioning assuredness” in public opinion, 
fueled by policy makers, law enforcement officers, and mass media, about “the seriousness of 
what hackers have done” (6). At the empirical level, studies of news media coverage show how 
“regardless of the reality of the cyberterrorism threat,” news media constructs cyberterrorism 
as a security risk (Jarvis, Macdonald and Whiting 2015). From the perspective of philosophy 
and politics of technology, Nissenbaum argues that there are two reasons for “demonizing 
hackers” (another way to describe the transformation of hackers into folk devils): the struggle 
over how normalcy is defined to designate the good citizen in the age of computer and to justify 
increases in security, surveillance, and punishment (Nissenbaum 2004, 199-200). Through 
the lens of critical criminology, Bowman-Grieve (2015) also emphasizes how mobilizing 
fear can be an instrument to promote social control, especially thinking about terrorism and 
cyberterrorism (103), two issues that will be of much more relevance in my later discussion on 
the criminalization of hacktivists.
Compared to the popular yet dangerous villains of film and news media, the image of the 
anonymized cybercriminal is the culmination of a much more politically loaded process of 
signification. Images are always central in moral panics and most commonly, moral panics 
function through “suasive images” that make meanings easy to grasp and that arouse emotions 
(Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) 2009, 27). The hooded image of hackers carries the 
vulnerability of global systems dependent on digital networks, increases fear of ambiguous 
cybercrime, and blurs the boundaries of who is and who is not the good citizen. Hackers as 
folk devils are much more complicated than previous folk devils because of the ambiguity of 
this representation. Yet, it would be unfair to say that this construction results just from the efforts 
of agencies of social control in the society. Hacktivists also embrace this anonymized popular 
image in their own way.
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The performance of hackers and hacktivists differ from each other in the way they act and in 
the way they claim their deeds. Even though both identities are well invested in recognition, 
hackers mostly seek internal recognition from the hacker community, while hacktivists work 
for recognition by a wider audience. Most hackers use pseudonyms to achieve anonymized 
recognition. As hacktivists are political actors acting collectively, individual pseudonyms are 
insufficient to meet their need for recognition. Therefore, they seek a personally anonymized yet 
collectively distinguishable recognition. Then another tool comes onto the scene – masks.
The Guy Fawkes mask is one the most popular masks of the 2010s thanks to its shared usage by 
protestors all over the world. However, before the wave of Occupy movements and the Arab 
uprisings, it was the hacktivist group Anonymous who first collectivized the mask by borrowing it 
from internet forums to use in simultaneous street/offline protests against the Scientology Church 
in February 2008, as a follow-up to previous online protests (Deseriis 2015, 184). Originally, 
the Guy Fawkes mask referred to the seventeenth-century English Catholic revolutionary Guy 
Fawkes who tried to explode the House of Lords. This event, called the Gunpowder Plot, was 
commemorated in Great Britain by burning effigies of unpopular figures for more than two 
centuries. The stylized Guy Fawkes mask was first designed for the comic book V for Vendetta 
(Moore and Lloyd 1988-1989) but its spike in usage as a symbol in protest coincides with the 
eponymous movie (McTeigue 2005), adapted from the comic. When Anonymous began to use 
the mask in their video messages, it became the overarching symbol of the group.
According to art historian Broeckmann (2017), the Guy Fawkes mask is an example of how 
the human face has an important role in images of anonymity (400). In his work on political 
iconography, Kohns (2013) supports this argument by claiming that “a mask performs a double 
gesture: By veiling one face, it makes visible another” (93). Related to my discussion of folk 
Figure 3: Anonymous (@YourAnonNews). 2018. “Stylized Guy Fawkes Mask.” Twitter.
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devils, the Fawkes mask is a transformative appropriation of anonymity by the labelled ones. 
While the mass media intensifies the fear of cybercrime by images of anonymity like hooded 
figures, the Guy Fawkes mask used by Anonymous makes visible the face of Guy Fawkes, an 
anonymous face full of historical and political meanings. In this sense, it is not just anonymity but 
also being a folk devil that hacktivists reappropriate.
The Guy Fawkes mask found its way to Turkey during the popular protests of 2013. Soon it 
was sold on every corner of Taksim Square, the main outlet of the Gezi protests in Istanbul. It 
became widespread during the Gezi protests but even before that, the mask was seen used by 
protesters who were holding banners of Redhack at May Day 2013. 
During the Gezi protests, the imagery from the photograph of a woman, relatively advanced in 
age, wearing traditional clothes and a Guy Fawkes mask, took its place among the imagery of 
the Gezi protests under the name of V for Vildan Teyze [Vildan Aunty]. It is through Vildan Aunty 
that the symbolic mask of the hacktivist group became one of the symbols of the Gezi protests.
Called the “Invincibles,” referring to the Turkish translation of the Hollywood movie The 
Avengers (Whedon 2012), a dozen individuals and few organizations became part of the Gezi 
imagery. V for Vildan Aunty was not the only figure with a hidden face from the Gezi pantheon. 
A black-dressed male figure with a hidden face under a red scarf was among the first four 
symbols of the Gezi protests. It was Redhack, the Marxist-Leninist hacktivist group. This time, 
distinct from the political baggage of the Guy Fawkes mask, Redhack’s red scarf was carrying 
other meanings and other fears: the imagery of folk devil was loaded with the history of radical 
left.
Figure 4: The banner says “those who cannot be disciplined with 
advice should be scolded, those who cannot be disciplined with 
scolding deserve Redhack (this is an adaptation from a famous 
aphorism through a vocal wordplay between kötek [stick that can 
be used for beating] and Redhack. This adapted aphorism was 
first used by the group in their Twitter account.
Figure 5: Detail from “Gezi Parkı 
Direnişinin Sivrilen Aktörleri: 
Yenilmezler [Shining Actors of 
Gezi Park Resistance: Invincibles]” 
(Başka Haber 2013).
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As did Anonymous, Redhack embraced anonymity, this time provided by the red scarf. The 
imagery from the documentary produced by a left-wing film production center (RED! 2013) 
about the group would become the representative image of Redhack, as it would repeatedly 
be used by the group itself, as well as the news media. The imagery of hackers and hacktivists 
reveals peculiarities of different subcultures worldwide and the interconnections between them. 
As a topic largely discussed in global media studies, these links, influences, and disconnections 
are embedded in their related contexts. A superficial reading that would consider hacker and 
hacktivist imagery in Turkey as an imitation of Anglo-American practices would be deficient if 
it did not include an examination of the hooded figure and its representation of crime or these 
examples of different shapes of anonymity with changing meanings in this discussion. So far, 
even though my focus was on Turkey, I examined diverse cultural meanings of hacking and 
hacktivism through comparisons between different contexts by following the perspective of 
Marwan Kraidy to consider the global not as “a settled geographical category” but as being 
“comprehensive” and “as a fundamental dimension of our world” (Kraidy 2018, 342). Cultural 
meanings of hacktivism in Turkey cannot be thought of separately from their global dimension, 
yet they cannot be understood without examining the embeddedness of the hacktivist culture 
in the Turkish context. This duality will be one of the theoretical underground streams in the 
remainder of this CARGC Paper.  
RED HACKERS AND HOW TO STUDY THEM
Redhack is a hacktivist organization with a radical leftist identity, which is easily perceptible 
in their discourse and in their imagery. As a self-identified Marxist-Leninist hacktivist group 
(Redhack 2013), they diverge clearly from other hacktivist groups in Turkey, most of whom are 
“patriotic hackers,” those who work for the sake of nationalist causes, as defined in hacktivism 
Figure 6: Title in white: Avengers [Invincibles]; Titles in black: Girl in Black, 
Redhack, Standing Man, Lady in Red (Resistart 2013, translated by Resistart).
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literature (Denning 2011).3 Their explicitly radical political stance differentiates Redhack from 
other worldwide known hacktivist groups who espouse implicit libertarian and/or anarchist 
ideologies. Redhack does not possess just a general affinity with leftist politics in Turkey: they 
explicitly claim to cherish revolutionary solidarity (Redhack, Kısa Tarihçe [Short History] 2012). 
Even though the political ideology of the group does not correspond to other hacktivist groups’ 
political stances, their repertoire of contention is very similar to other hacktivists. Website 
defacements, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and information leaks are the 
principal tools that most hacktivist groups use in the 2010s. Redhack has defaced hundreds of 
public websites (and few company websites) in protest of events, to support offline protests, or 
to commemorate the martyrs of the revolution, a notion borrowed from leftist culture.
The group became highly popular with their first known leak from the Ankara Police Directorate 
website in February 2012. After the leak, Redhack publicized information about the citizen 
informants who had sent emails to the police directorate (Radikal 2012). This breach of the 
state’s website was a milestone for their judiciary history, too. Even though it was not a very 
crucial leak – compared to later leaks – it did serious damage to the authority of the state, 
resulting in an investigation that led to the first hacktivism trial in Turkey (Ankara Chief Public 
Prosecutor’s Office 2012). In that trial, all suspects were acquitted of “being a member of a 
terrorist organization, committing a crime in the name of the organization,” due to the lack of 
evidence (Ankara Heavy Penal Court no. 7 2015).
3 Some influential scholars within hacktivism literature like Dorothy E. Denning (2011) do not 
categorize patriotic hackers inside the hacktivism category. I find this distinction between 
hacktivists and patriotic hackers also very problematic, as it depends on a very abstract 
definition of what activism is. For that reason, instead of dissociating these categories, I put 
patriotic hackers under the umbrella term of hacktivism.  
Figure 7: A scene from the documentary RED! that would be duplicated several 
times (RED! 2013).
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In May 2013, Redhack hacked and leaked documents allegedly belonging to the Gendarmerie 
Intelligence Department about the 2013 Reyhanli explosion. In the car bombing at Reyhanli, 
a Turkish town near the Syrian border, more than fifty people died and hundreds more were 
injured. The government claimed that this incident was the responsibility of a leftist group. 
The documents leaked by Redhack showed that it was the deed of Al-Qaeda and, more 
importantly, that law enforcement agents had intelligence about it before the explosion 
happened (Milliyet 2013). As a result of the leak, one private soldier who was accused of 
leaking state secrets spent half a year in prison before being released in November 2013 
(Hürriyet, 2013); in 2016 that he was finally acquitted (Sputnik Türkiye 2016).
The last sensational leak of Redhack occurred in September 2016. The AKP government had 
issued a state of emergency right after the failed military coup.4 Even though the AKP declared 
that these measures were taken to consolidate the democracy, the state of emergency was used 
by the government to apply a large-scale purge of dissidents. In September 2016, Redhack 
declared that they had hacked the email account of the Minister of Energy, Berat Albayrak, also 
the son-in-law of President Erdoğan . They said that they would publicize the content if the leftist 
dissidents who had been taken into custody were not released (Birgün 2016). Redhack also 
stated that they witnessed preferential treatment, corruption, being a banana republic5, and the 
flattery of mass media executives in 17.3 GB of emails sent between 2000 and 2016 (Yolculuk 
2016). The tight control of the government over mainstream media and social media platforms 
was also explicit in the leaks, as well as information about the formation of government Twitter 
troll armies dating back to the Gezi protests (Sozeri 2016). The most politically delicate issue 
involved emails that showed the close relationship between Albayrak and Powertrans, an oil 
company implicated in deals with oil produced by ISIS (Independent 2016). The mainstream 
media completely ignored the leak because of government pressure, and by December 
2016, the government had begun to detain dissident journalists who had reported on the 
leaked emails (Bianet 2016). In October and December 2017, after one year of detention, the 
journalists were released (Diken 2017). As of March 2018, this case was still in process and 
the accused journalists were still facing charges of “being a member of a terrorist organization, 
committing a crime in the name of the organization,” of “making the propaganda of a terrorist 
organization,” and of “being a member of a terrorist organization”6 (Diken 2018).
4 This coup was allegedly caused by the Gülen movement, which is an economic and social 
community, politically active as the former ally and now rival of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP).
5 A little bit distanced and simplified usage from its original meaning, banana republic is a 
popular term referring to non-democratic political contexts and used to criticize the prevalence 
of corruption and anti-democratic practices in Turkey.
6 In the first legal case against Redhack, the suspects were accused of being members of 
Redhack. In this trial, the journalists were accused of being members of different alleged terrorist 
organizations with opposite political ideologies, as opposed to accusations of being members 
of Redhack.
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These cases, together with several investigations conducted by prosecutors specializing in anti-
terrorism between 2013 and 2016, show the keen interest of the Turkish state in the hacktivist 
group and its framing not just as a criminal organization but explicitly as a terrorist organization. 
Even though these judicial events are concrete reflections of a criminalization process, fertile 
ground for an academic examination, my study on Redhack’s criminalization would not be an 
easy journey, mostly because of the dominant approach in the literature on hacktivism, which 
tends to disembed hacktivism from its contextual roots.
The early literature on hacktivism argued for a clear definition of hacktivism with a serious effort 
to differentiate it from cyberterrorism. For that reason, any discussion of legal transgressions 
is limited by the abstract categories of “civil disobedience” and “terrorism.” Scholars define 
hacktivism as “electronic civil disobedience” (Wray 1998), “cyber disobedience” (Huschle 
2002), or simply, “a form of civil disobedience” (Krapp 2005). Even though academic works 
acknowledge the ambiguity of boundaries separating hacktivism from cyberterrorism, in many 
influential works, the definitional ambiguity between the two remains. Frequently-cited scholar 
in the field of hacktivism, Dorothy Denning, defines hacktivism as “operations that use hacking 
techniques against a target’s internet site with the intent of disrupting normal operations but not 
causing serious damage [emphasis added]” (2001, 241). In another work, hacktivist acts are 
considered as “de facto illegal but not malicious acts [emphasis added]” (Auty 2004). 
The repetitive effort of academia to sterilize hacktivism from the germs of terrorism should be 
considered within its larger sociopolitical context. Scholars study hacktivism under the heavy 
pressure of the label of (cyber)terrorism, which is another and much more popular category of 
folk devil in our era. Cohen argues that refugees and asylum seekers constituted an important 
category of moral panic in Europe through the 1990s (Cohen 2002, xix), associated with 
“bringing terror and violence” (xx). After 9/11, terrorism became a much more emphasized 
moral panic. For Goode and Ben-Yehuda, terrorists are the perfect example of contemporary 
folk devils (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 2009, 27). Bowman-Grieve (2015) is one of the first 
scholars to study cyberterrorism through the lens of moral panics. She claims that cyberterrorists 
are “vilified as the potential harbingers of social disintegration in relation to the potential attacks 
they could instigate using the Internet and/or IT” (2015, 99).
This context reveals the urgency behind the academic effort to distinguish hacktivism from 
cyberterrorism. However, I believe that this academic effort also became a part of the 
construction of moral panics around the subject of cyberterrorism. Moral panics are not always 
dependent on “noisy” constructions with public or mass media exposure. Rather, “quiet” 
constructions are mostly conducted by professionals, experts, and bureaucrats (Cohen 2002, 
xxiii). Academics should be added to this list. Their abstract categorizations and their efforts at 
differentiation support the construction of moral panics for cyberterrorism.
In contrast to earlier approaches that explicitly differentiated hacktivism from cyberterrorism, 
recent works focus on different aspects of hacktivism. Yet, in most cases, despite an implicit 
recognition of the distinction of hacktivist groups from cyberterrorism, they nonetheless 
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reproduce the discourse of moral panics. Anthropologist Gabriella Coleman’s (2014) last 
book on Anonymous provides such an example. In her introduction, she shares an interesting 
anecdote with her readers. Widely considered to be an expert on Anonymous, Coleman was 
invited to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service headquarters to give a briefing about the 
hacktivist group. During her lecture, she outlined how she conceived of the supposed affinity 
between Al-Qaeda operatives and Anonymous:
I just could not fathom Al-Qaeda operatives watching Anonymous videos, 
much less grasping the nature of their culture or politics, and especially not 
the lulz. I imagined that jihadists would be rather repelled by Anonymous’ 
secular, infidel, offensive practices. Laughing heartily together, we all 
agreed that those jihadist terrorists likely did not celebrate the lulz (Cole-
man 2014, 15, emphasis added). 7
Coleman’s narrative about the briefing exhibits the widespread tendency by hacktivist 
specialists to differentiate hacktivism from terrorism. Coleman’s significant contribution to this 
effort is her emphasis on the humor of Anonymous, which is represented by “the lulz.” In her 
experience in Canadian security headquarters, this aspect becomes fundamental to convince 
intelligence analysts that Anonymous is different from terrorists like Al-Qaeda jihadists because 
the hacktivist group has this humor that the terrorists could not understand. This time, the humor, 
the laugh, the lulz, and trolling become the divergent point between hacktivism and terrorism. 
From this perspective, folk devils and humor cannot be compatible. The tendency to consider 
humor as the concretization of democratic resistance is a fetish that ignores what humor really is: 
one of many instruments of expression.
When cultural criminology scholars developed the method of synthesizing “structural factors 
with an analysis of group dynamics, ideological influence, and individual incentives and 
personal motivations” (Ferrell, Hayward and Young 2015, 137), they took terrorism studies a 
critical step further. Yet, when Ferrell, Hayward, and Young (2015) defend their position that, 
at the micro level, the question of how terrorists feel is as important as the questions of how 
they act and how they think; these feelings are restricted to “existential” feelings like “desire for 
excitement, desire for ultimate feeling and desire for glory” (141), as if to differentiate terrorists 
from ordinary people. At the end, even the critical field of cultural criminology suffers from a 
two-dimensional representation of terrorists, whose feelings and thoughts cannot include humor, 
an ordinary feeling that is inaccessible to inhumans.
Putting aside this implicit contribution to the discourse of moral panics, the effort to distinguish 
hacktivism from cyberterrorism creates two fundamental problems. At the theoretical level, it 
creates an ungrounded categorization that should be accepted to the detriment of contextual 
differences about what is hacktivism and what is terrorism. So, it makes hacktivism, terrorism, 
7 According to Encyclopedia Dramatica, lulz is “a corruption of LOL, which stands for “Laugh 
Out Loud,” signifying laughter at someone else’s expense.” Coleman interprets lulz as an 
example of argot in the sense of “specialized and esoteric terminology used by a subcultural 
group” (Coleman 2014, 31). Trolls and hackers are the main actors of this subculture. 
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and cyberterrorism disembeded and definite categories. This is academically problematic 
and politically dangerous because of how it collapses all other political struggles apart from 
civil disobedience into the category of terrorism. What will we do when we have examples 
like Redhack who celebrate the lulz, in their own way, but do not fit the category of civil 
disobedience? These paradigms cannot provide explanation for groups like Redhack, 
contributing to the sense that it is an anomaly, as I pointed to in the introduction.
A more recent trend in hacktivism studies tries to problematize this disembededness of 
boundaries and develops two important perspectives. The first, like the work of Sandor Vegh 
(2005), emphasizes the discourse of criminalization used against hacktivists. Mainstream US 
media’s portrayal of hacktivism before and after 9/11 is a significant example in which this shift 
from criminals to cyberterrorists is considered as the “elite’s crusade” to eradicate hacking for 
being “an activity that may potentially threaten the dominant order” (Vegh 2005, 1). Fidele 
Vlavo (2015) claims that the myth of cyberterrorism was constructed in response to the concept 
of cyberprotest, when hacktivist groups were already performing online protest and writing 
about it (8). She claims:
The terms cyberterrorism and cyberprotest have been formulated to counter 
one another and are part of a discursive claim for political and legal recog-
nition. What is at stake here is, on the one side, an activist re-appropriation 
of digital technologies and, on the other side, governmental and corporate 
compulsion to fully control the networks (Vlavo 2015, 9).
I find these approaches very important for the problematization of ungrounded boundaries. 
However, they lack another important step, which is the problematization of the categories 
themselves – of cyberactivism and cyberterrorism, as well as activism and terrorism.
The second recent approach to deconstructing criminalization discourse consists of making 
visible the self-perception of hacktivists. From this perspective, Leonie Tanczer (2017) vocalizes 
hacktivists’ objections to seeing hacking and hacktivism portrayed as violent acts. From the field 
of critical criminology, Kevin Steinmetz’s work (2016) is an interesting hybrid of criminology’s 
traditional preoccupation with the actor, similar to the anthropological interest in the “native,” 
and of Marxist and radical criminological perspectives, which seek to demystify the ideology 
surrounding hackers. Steinmetz calls for a “sensitivity to broader historical, social, economic, 
and political forces” in studying hackers and his book presents a good example of “situating 
hacking within the conflicts and contradictions of late capitalism” (Steinmetz 2016, 221). 
However, his earlier emphasis on the perception of hackers limits the work in the sense of 
a preoccupation with the “terrorist” actor. As the label of “terrorist” actor) is the product of 
terrorism discourse, I follow the suggestion of Hülsse and Spencer (2008) to take not the actor 
but the discourse of criminalization as my starting point (575-576). 
The intellectual pitfalls I have tried to avoid in this CARGC Paper also provide rescue lines that 
I use to develop my own approach to the study of the criminalization of Redhack. I rely on 
two principal perspectives from different fields. The first is the constructivist turn in the field of 
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criminology and terrorism studies. The constructivist turn in criminology coincides with the rise 
of critical criminology. The term folk devils that I introduced at the beginning of the paper is one 
of the main notions that I take as a reference point during my case study. From the constructivist 
turn in terrorism studies, Hülsse and Spencer’s aforementioned work (2008) guides me away 
from the preoccupation with the actor and towards attention to the discourse of criminalization. 
A step already taken by critical criminology scholars, this is still a heterodox approach in 
terrorism studies mainly because terrorists are still the most widely accepted folk devils of our 
era.
The other rescue line is the revival of a focus on ideology within framing theory that I borrow 
from social movements studies (SMS). Many of the works on the criminalization discourse about 
hackers and hacktivists are based on framing analysis, some cited in this paper. Based upon the 
influential work of Goffman (1974), framing analysis is both a favored and criticized method 
in the study of social movements (Oliver and Johnston 2000), in political communication 
(Carragee and Roefs 2004), and in cultural criminology ( Hayward and Presdee 2010). 
Framing analysis is a shift of “focus to linguistic analysis of conversational conventions that 
mark the application and changes in interpretative frames” (Oliver and Johnston 2000, 40). 
Oliver and Johnston claim that in its current form, framing analysis is used most commonly to 
understand individual cognitive structures (41). They argue that to understand the social and 
political content of framing processes, ideologies should be taken into consideration because 
“framing points to process, while ideology points to content” (45). In the field of political 
communication, a similar perspective is articulated by Carragee and Roefs (2004) with an 
emphasis on “how political and social contexts shape framing contests” (214), alongside 
an investigation of “how the distribution of power shapes the construction and interpretation 
of these frames” (215). Scholars working on framing analysis in the field of communication 
focus mainly on the construction and circulation of frames in news media (see Entman 1993; 
Scheufele 2000; and Liebler, Schwartz and Harper 2009), while SMS scholars look to the 
frames used by the actors of social movements (Benford 1993; Gamson, Meyer and Zald 1996; 
and Snow 2004). 
Diverging from these traditions, Carragee and Roefs (2004) defend that framing research 
should have three pillars: the sponsoring of frames by political actors, their usage by journalists, 
and their interpretation by audiences (215). I adopt their multi-sited approach and adapt it 
to the context of the criminalization discourse about the hacktivist group Redhack in Turkey. 
However, I diverge from Carragee and Roefs in their consideration of these categories as 
separate entities. For me, different sites of a criminalization discourse constitute a whole in which 
the sponsoring, the circulation, and the interpretation of certain frames intermingle. For that 
reason, I expand the traditional use of framing analysis for my case study. In this perspective, I 
examine the construction of the criminalization of the hacktivist group Redhack in the (un)official 
discourse through the framing analysis.
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THE CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINALIZATION
In the remainder of this CARGC Paper, I focus on how the Turkish state constructs the 
criminalization of Redhack. While examining state discourse, I do not consider the Turkish state 
as a monolithic entity. On the contrary, I problematize how different parts of the Turkish state 
tend to act like an indivisible whole, especially in specific political issues, which has the effect 
of making invisible the conflicts between power elites. My aim in this section is to make visible 
official and unofficial state discourses. By unofficial, I mean the discourse of state agents whose 
voices are not heard explicitly, but who implement official discourse. They actively shape the 
criminalization discourse without being recognized as the official constructors of discourse. 
There are judicial actors and law enforcement agents (LEAs). There are the sources from which 
I collected data to examine the criminalization process of the Turkish state: court documents 
from the Redhack case, information on the legal investigations about Redhack collected from 
news media, and interviews I conducted with the unofficial constructors of the criminalization 
discourse.
The first Redhack-related case was the result of the breach of the Ankara Police Directorate 
website in February 2012, as mentioned above. The investigation of this leak led to a trial in 
November 2012 (Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office 2012), resulting in the acquittal of 
all suspects in March 2015 (Ankara Heavy Penal Court no. 7 2015). The indictment and the 
reasoned decision of the court are the two main written documents on which I rely. Concerning 
the legal investigations of Redhack, there is a scarcity of sources because these investigations 
are conducted under confidentiality order, which prevents access to investigation materials. 
For that reason, my sources are limited to what little information is shared in the mass media. 
Concerning the interviews, I used a snowball technique to reach interviewees who were 
specialized or interested in cybercrime and/or terrorism,8 the two main camps of official 
accusation towards Redhack. 
The framing that the Turkish state uses for the hacktivist group Redhack is quite different from 
other criminalized persons or groups in the contemporary sociopolitical context. It is almost 
a non-framing when compared to its typical, aggressive crime framing. However, it does not 
mean that the Turkish state has a positive image of the group. This was an important point to 
consider in the methodology of my data collection. As a perfect mirror image to the hacktivism 
literature, naming an organization “hacktivist” implies a negative image and a non-neutral 
position in the eyes of state agents. For that reason, the explicit word that I used in my interviews 
was “hackers” rather than “hacktivists,” even though the discussion was mostly about hackers 
with political motivations, so implicitly with the same category as hacktivists. Judicial documents, 
information about the legal investigations, and my interviews reveal a pattern in which the state 
appears in a very central and constant role while the hackers’ position is quite ambiguous and 
unstable.
8 Interviewees’ interest or specialization in cybercrime or terrorism does not necessarily 
coincide with active duty. 
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The Turkish state’s presence in Turkish political discourse is always highly visible. This presence 
is not limited to the state agents’ discourse and it is not even restricted by the discourse. Even 
during quite different forms of mediation like popular protests, oppressive reactions coming 
from the government, municipal policy-makers, law enforcement, and judicial bodies are easily 
interpreted as the reactions of the state from the perspective of outsiders and dissenters to state 
policies. Certainly, the state has a historical centrality in the Turkish political context according 
to many influential scholars, like sociologist Çağlar Keyder (1987). Recent works criticize this 
argument of powerful state tradition for creating an antagonism between state and society that 
covers class contradictions and exploitation (Dinler 2003, 50). Following this criticism, political 
scientist Şebnem Oğuz (2009) analyzes the contemporary centrality of the state in politics as 
a restructuring related to the neoliberal transformation in the 1980s, resulting in “neoliberal 
authoritarian statism” (17), rather than because of the powerful state tradition in Turkey.
In the case of hacktivism, this centrality of the state appears once again. During the first semi-
structured interview that I conducted with LEAs, my question of whether there are good hackers 
and bad hackers, referring to the well-known distinction between “black” and “white” hackers 
was responded to with “the hacker of the state is the good hacker [emphasis added]” (LEAs 
1 2017). I have already mentioned above how different bodies inside the Turkish state are 
perceived as an indivisible whole named “the state” by outsiders. In an interactive way, these 
bodies – especially the “punitive” ones like law enforcement agents – self-describe as “the 
state,” as if the Turkish state is a homogenous and constant whole, too. It is the state’s police, the 
state’s army, the state’s courts, the state’s prosecutors and so on. From this perspective, hackers 
can belong to the state, too. Here, I use belonging in the sense of serving the ideology of the 
Turkish state, which is consistently framed as a constant whole. As another interviewee stated, 
“Hackers should act like a shield and as a sword, to prevent another attack (LEAs 4 2017). 
Actually, this war frame is not that unfamiliar to us when we recall that almost every antivirus 
software brand that we use in our computers have shields as their symbols. 
This ideal hacker described by law enforcement agents corresponds to the concrete category 
of patriotic hackers. In Turkey, patriotic hackers existed long before the popularity of groups 
like Anonymous or Redhack. Ayyildiz Tim and Cyberwarrior Tim are some of the well-known 
examples, which have been visible in the hacktivism scene since the early 2000s. In this context, 
Redhack is the first widely known hacktivist group in Turkey who did not espouse a nationalist 
ideology. Even though all contemporary hacktivist groups share a similar “digital repertoire of 
contention” (Earl ve Kimport 2011), the difference between them become much more apparent 
related to their targets. In accordance with their nationalist ideology, patriotic hackers never 
targeted Turkish state’s websites, while these websites were the main target of Redhack. This 
point emerged during the interviews, too. Redhack is “not a good hacker organization because 
they attacked public institutions [emphasis added]” (LEAs 1 2017). 
In the Turkish language, “people” [halk] and “public” [kamu] are not overlapping terms. 
“People” has a class-based connotation designating lower-classes and it is a whole, separated 
strictly from the state. On the other hand, public means that which is not private, used often to 
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define urban public places that are not enclosed. But “public” also designates the ownership 
of the state. In this sense, public is an ambiguous term, an intermediary between two distinctly 
separate categories: people and the state. When state agents accuse Redhack of attacking 
public institutions, this accusation implies “the state” but also “the people,” without indicating 
either. Such an ambiguity creates an interpretative political space where different notions of 
people, public, and state fluidly overlap. This overlap is emphasized much more when the label 
of terrorism is discussed. 
As a part of a recent global trend, the label of terrorism became quite popular in political 
discourse in Turkey starting with the military coup of 1980.9 Politician and economist Sungur 
Savran (1987) characterizes the military coup of 1980 as the erasure of the political regime, 
which was built upon the struggle of the working class (153). This date is an important 
milestone for the development of neoliberal conservative policies in the Turkish context, as 
the coup succeeded in totally erasing the leftist political presence, both discursively and 
physically.  The Turkish Anti-Terror Law of 1991 is the embodiment of this, accentuated by the 
civil war in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, alongside the last fragments of the armed radical 
leftist tradition struggling for a socialist revolution in different parts of the country including 
the Kurdish regions.10 The expansion of the terrorism label is part of this larger transformation 
of political crimes (against the state) to terrorism acts sponsored by the Turkish state. This 
discursive transformation was criticized by legal scholars (Bayraktar 2015). However, through 
the mainstream news media’s widespread circulation, public opinion largely accepted this 
transformation. For that reason, it would be a mistake to consider the contemporary stretching 
of the term terrorism by the AKP government and especially by President Erdoğan, as something 
new. However, he undeniably contributed perfect examples of this legacy. 
Erdoğan’s definition of “unarmed terrorists” in March 2016 was a milestone that would 
determine the period ahead. Advancing a new frame of terrorism, he declared: “There is no 
difference between terrorists and those who gave order to [influenced] the terrorists by using 
9 On September 12, 1980, the armed forces, led by the chief of staff, General Kenan Evren, 
took over political power in Turkey. A state of emergency was declared. They dissolved the 
parliament and deposed the cabinet. All political parties and some trade union confederations 
were suspended. The political party leaders were arrested and mass trials were organized 
against political organizations from leftwing and from extreme rightwing. Those responsible for 
the military coup justified their actions on the civil war and on the political violence in the late 
1970s. However, the coup resulted in hundreds of dismissed, imprisoned, and tortured leftists. 
More details about the coup can be found in Zürcher’s work (2005, 278-288).
10 After the military coup, the Kurdish movement became much more independent from the 
larger leftist groups in Turkey, which were diminished by imprisonment, assassination, and 
exile. On the other hand, the remainder of these leftist groups in Turkey tried to continue their 
armed struggles but they did not have the power they had in the 1970s. Against both of them, 
the Turkish state developed a policy of zero tolerance, which resulted in a civil war and the 
massacre of leftist and Kurdish militants during the horrifying days of the 1990s. This is in this 
political atmosphere that the Anti-terror Law was promulgated in Turkey.
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its position, its pen and its title. An academic, a journalist, the director of an NGO are also 
terrorists” (Diken 2016). This statement dates to a period in which political conjuncture was 
heavily dependent on the use of violence. While the Turkish state was using violence against 
civilians in Kurdish regions, suicide bombings had become a political tool used by ideologically 
diverse groups like ISIS and TAK, an armed, Kurdish ultra-nationalist organization. This also 
coincides with the dissemination of the Petition for Peace, a call for action to the Turkish state to 
stop the violence against the civilians signed by thousands of academicians.11 
Although the judicial reaction was quite severe against Redhack, political actors and the 
mainstream news media were mostly silent about the discourse of terrorism applied to the group 
in this densely politicized media atmosphere. Before Erdoğan’s new frame of terrorism in March 
2016, the only attempt to label Redhack’s hacktivism as terrorism came from judicial bodies. 
Nevertheless, this labelling was marked with explicit indecision.
During the first Redhack investigation in 2012, the prosecutor specializing in cybercrime 
decided that this was outside of his jurisdiction and the investigation was transferred to the 
prosecutor specializing in anti-terrorism (Hürriyet Daily News, Prosecutor Demands RedHack 
be Declared ‘Terrorist’ Organization 2012). When the trial opened after this investigation, 
material from Redhack’s website, which was shut down the same day Redhack published 
the leaked information, was exhibited as evidence of a terrorist organization (Ankara Chief 
Public Prosecutor’s Office 2012). The reason for this accusation was that on their website, 
Redhack framed its mission as “being in solidarity with other revolutionary organizations in 
Turkey, especially illegal ones” (Redhack 2012). In May 2013, during another investigation 
related to Redhack, this time, anti-terrorism prosecutors declared that Redhack was not a 
terrorist organization because it was not an armed organization (Hürriyet Daily News 2013). 
In November 2013, during the second investigation into Redhack, the prosecutor specializing 
in cybercrime once again requested the investigation be taken up by anti-terror prosecution 
(Sputnik Turkiye 2013). 
This indecision is meaningful in the larger context of the transformation of political crimes into 
terrorism in the political discourse. During my interviews, law enforcement agents emphasized 
that Redhack’s is a terrorism case because “they intended for the state [emphasis added]” (LEAs 
4 2017). ‘Intent’ is a commonly used term in the legal documents. Yet, its common direct use with 
the formative ‘for’ is when it is used when referring to killing, as an ‘intent to kill’ for which the 
formative ‘for’ can be used as ‘intent for life.’ Intent does not have just the meaning of neutral 
intention but also the meaning of “to harm, to kill, a wish to damage, a bad intention” (Türk Dil 
11 In January 2016, more than 2000 academicians signed the petition “We will not be a 
party to this crime!” to criticize the violence of the Turkish State in Sur, Silvan, Nusaybin, Cizre, 
Silopi, and many others. More information about the petition text alongside the intimidation, 
repression, defamation, and prosecution processes against the academicians who signed this 
text can be found at this website: https://barisicinakademisyenler.net.
Contextualizing Hacktivism: The Criminalization of Redhack
 CARGC PAPER 10 2019
 Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 24
Kurumu [Turkish Language Association]). For people inside the judicial field, this usage is quite 
familiar but through the critical perspective of social sciences, this usage evokes an almost 
equalization of “killing somebody” with harming the state.
During one of the interviews that I conducted with law enforcements agents, I encountered a 
concrete illustration in line with this equation of killing somebody with harming the state. As 
we were discussing cyberterrorism, the agent explained to me, “you just add cyber to normal 
crimes, like cyberattack, cyberterrorism.” Then, he gave me two examples; an attack on public 
institutions as cyberterrorism and the attacks of “the terrorist organization DAES” because they 
attack human rights (LEAs 4 2017). Here the framing of cyberterrorism, as a mere appendix to 
the word terrorism entails the critical synchronization of these two acts.
This emphasis on the weight of crimes against the state is not limited to the use of one word or to 
the imagery of one law enforcement agent. The Turkish Anti-Terror Law of 1991 is a rich source 
in this respect: 
Terrorism is any kind of act done by one or more persons belonging to an 
organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic 
(…) damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, 
endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or 
destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights 
and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, 
public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, ter-
ror, intimidation, oppression or threat (Turkish Anti-Terror Law 1991, emphasis 
added).
The label of terrorism is frequently used by political actors, in news media, and during public 
discussions, yet there is not an agreed-upon definition. During my interviews, a leftist lawyer 
clarified that with the current Turkish legislation based principally on the Anti-Terror Law of 1991, 
it was logical for prosecutors and judges to consider Redhack as a terrorist organization even 
though for him, it was an issue of cybercrime (Lawyer 1 2017). Meanwhile, another interviewee 
specializing in cybercrime declared that Redhack could not be a terrorist organization, relying 
on the most universally accepted definition of terrorism (Lawyer 3 2017). 
[T]he use of violence to create fear for political, religious, or ideological 
reasons. The terror is intentionally aimed at noncombatant targets, and the 
objective is to achieve the greatest attainable publicity for a group, cause, 
or individual. (…) the impact of terrorist violence and damage reaches more 
than the immediate target victims. It is also directed at targets consisting of a 
larger spectrum of society (Matusitz 2013, 4, emphasis added).
This lawyer defended his position by saying that Redhack was not terrorizing the people. This 
approach is quite critical of applying the label of terrorist to the group Redhack. However, 
as discussed above, to keep Redhack separate from other alleged terrorist groups and 
problematize only the labelling of the hacktivist group is an implicit endorsement of the 
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normative discourse of terrorism as it functions in the contemporary Turkey. It shows that while 
the state positions itself as the ultimate victim of terrorist acts by blurring the notions of people, 
public, and the state, the opposition to this discourse can be small-scale and not inclusive of 
other groups labelled as terrorists.
The last discussion about the (un)official discourse of the state is related to the framing of 
Redhack as a group of incompetent hackers. “Everyone knows a good hacker but no one 
knows an excellent hacker” (LEAs 1 2017). This phrase returns us to the introductory discussion 
about the combination of fear and fascination mobilized by the figure of the hacker. In 2016, 
during another hacktivism trial in Turkey against a less known hacktivist organization called 
Cold Hackers, the prosecutor in charge prepared an indictment in which categories belonging 
to the hacker community like “lamer,” “hacker,” and “security administrator” are defined in a 
very detailed, disconnected, and subjective way. “Lamer” is a pseudo-category that hackers 
use as an insult to incompetent hackers. In the indictment, lamer is defined with a very long 
paragraph, which begins, “lamers are unskillful people who aspire to be hacker. They try 
to show off by memorizing parlor tricks” (Diyarbakır Heavy Penal Court No. 2 2016). Very 
different from the state who punishes the terrorists, the voice heard in this indictment is like one 
insider of the hacker community who insults another insider.
Together with the explicit regard for good hackers in my interviews, I venture that even in the 
discourse of the state, hackers are considered to be dangerous yet fascinating figures, folk 
devils. When a hacker group’s political motivations become much more apparent than their 
hacking skills, the alleged absence of hacking skills can be instrumental to discredit the enemy. 
From this perspective, it is not just their being terrorists, but also their being bad hackers, that 
becomes an issue. 
Claiming that Redhack is a bad hacker group and just a “terrorist organization” that the Turkish 
state is adept at containing ideologically, is a useful strategy. However, such a strategy denies 
the perception of the state about the potential danger of hackers and its possible vulnerability 
against hacktivists groups. The absence of “noisy” terrorism frames in news media coincides 
directly with this pretended negligence of Redhack. The silent framing of terrorism for Redhack 
creates a controllable political blank in which public discussions cannot find a place for 
themselves. The framing of the state makes Redhack just one of many terrorists of Turkey, nothing 
special, not a folk devil. In this sense, even though Redhack is the first hacktivist group framed as 
a terrorist organization, its framing is closely dependent upon the contextual needs of the Turkish 
state. 
...while the state 
positions itself as 
the ultimate victim 
of terrorist acts by 
blurring the notions 
of people, public, 
and the state, the 
opposition to this 
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CONCLUSION: THE FUNCTION OF AN ANOMALY
Let us return to the introductory question of “if Redhack is an anomaly, what could it tell us?” 
Even though this CARGC Paper is part of my larger PhD dissertation, the construction of the 
criminalization discourse for Redhack, together with its labelling as a terrorist organization by 
the state, reveals that abstract categories of hacktivism and cyberterrorism cannot display the 
embeddedness of hacktivist organizations into their own contexts. An understanding of the 
sociopolitical context and a historicizing effort for this context are necessary to problematize the 
discourses around hacktivist organizations, without which hacktivism cannot be understood as a 
social phenomenon. 
Focusing on Redhack was key to developing an approach that departs from the hacktivism 
literature because the present paradigm in the literature could not explain the criminalization of 
Redhack. That is one function of the anomaly of Redhack, in the sense of Thomas Kuhn’s classical 
work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962):
We always try to understand the different one, the anomaly, because it is the 
point where paradigms cannot provide explanation and that is because, it is 
the potential source for paradigm shifts / ones. Only when these attempts at 
articulation fail do scientists encounter the third type of phenomena, the rec-
ognized anomalies whose characteristic feature is their stubborn refusal to be 
assimilated to existing paradigms. This type alone gives rise to new theories 
(Kuhn 1962, 97). 
Redhack opens the space for a paradigm shift with the possibility to create new theories – this 
is the main function of Redhack within the hacktivism literature. The underground stream of 
imagining global as a comprehensive question in communication studies is also related to this 
shift in the hacktivism literature. Grounding the analysis of Redhack in a legal-political-cultural 
context is closely in line with Geertz’s theoretically grounded and empirically based approach 
that Kraidy and Murphy (2008) advocate for global communication studies. The risks of 
abstraction of the current hacktivism literature can be eliminated through such a focus on “the 
peculiarities of the local in its broader structural and comparative context” (Kraidy and Murphy 
2008, 341), while at the same time this focus can be the source of a paradigm shift for a new 
theorization. 
Another function of Redhack is related to the context of Turkey. As an anomaly that resists 
assimilation to existing paradigms of terrorism, Redhack’s framing as (cyber)terrorism can 
become an important outlet to problematize the discourse on terrorism, which in Turkey has 
been a continuing, powerful state discourse since 1980. Small-scale opposition to this framing 
can be the source of a larger rethinking of the terrorism label. Such an approach provides 
a fresh critical perspective resulting in infertile soil for unbiased works, not just for the Turkish 
context but also for the global context in which terrorism frames become much more inclusive 
and oppressive.
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